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Celebrity and ‘meritocracy’ 
Jo Littler 
 
In our contemporary ‘meritocratic’ culture new possibilities of social and cultural 
transition are being produced alongside sharp inequalities of wealth and status. Jo 
Littler examines how this is both reflected in and produced by current forms of celebrity 
culture and considers why celebrity is a political issue.  
 
‘You better lose yourself in the music, the moment  
You own it, you better never let it go  
You only get one shot, do not miss your chance to blow  
This opportunity comes once in a lifetime yo’ 1 
 
In the lyrics to Eminem’s Lose Yourself fame is not simply something that anyone 
talented can get if they work hard enough. The moments when it might pay off to strive 
are few and far between: celebrity is a chance moment, a fleeting conjunction, something 
necessary to seize because of its rarity. You mess up the moment and you will be back in 
the place you came from, the place to which you do not wish to return. Fame here is not 
merely the inevitable outcome of the diligent buffing up of some ‘raw talent’. It is not 
quite the low-risk Protestant celebrity work ethic offered by Fame Academy. Eminem’s 
lyrics describe a society in which celebrity is more of a random, and potentially cruel, 
lottery than a birthright for the righteously dedicated. They figure the fragility of fame; 
they articulate a sense of slim pickings, a place from which there are not many chances, a 
world in which it becomes all the more important to recognise and to channel intense 
energy into taking those chances up. In part the intensity comes out of this sense that it is 
as easy to lose everything as it is difficult to gain it.  
  
 
Lose Yourself zooms in upon and dramatises this moment of chance. As in the film to 
which these lyrics are soundtrack, 8 Mile, (whose hero ‘Rabbit’ is a semi-fictionalised 
representation of Eminem, the celebrity who plays him) the possibilities of becoming 
famous are pictured amidst a deprived social backdrop about which a complex tangle of 
sentiments and messages are expressed. The film is a powerful indictment of the injustice 
of American poverty, bringing to the big screen images of the depressed urban detritus of 
downsized industrialisation, dramatising with eloquent rage the difficulties of those 
kicked to the bottom of the social pile. At the same time, its implied solution is the 
individualistic achievement of pulling yourself up by the bootstraps against the odds (an 
ethos leading some commentators to describe Eminem as ‘the President’s friend’).2 The 
masculinity of our hero is reconfigured enough to promote a model of caring sensitivity 
towards children, yet not enough to have reworked its misogynism (all adult women are 
both inappropriately sexual and let him down badly).  The film presents its hybrid social 
groupings with easy familiarity, endorses an anti-essential understanding of ‘race’, is 
alive to some of racism’s effects and shows itself to be aware of the issue of 
appropriating cultures. Yet at the same time the relationship between the white hero and 
black cultures remains one in which ‘cool’ is co-opted, through which authenticity is 
sought and garnered, and within which the hero not only exists but triumphs over and 
then implicitly leaves behind.3 
 
If 8 Mile and Lose Yourself explicitly and expressively grapple with a range of 
contemporary topics and issues, they also display an array of motifs characteristic of our 
present mode of celebrity culture, motifs which are, in turn, related to these issues around 
‘race’, gender and inequalities of opportunity. Firstly, they invite us to get very intimate 
with the emotions of a celebrity. The slippery flux and continuum of Eminem’s star 
persona is heavily dependent on the appearance of him authentically mining and exposing 
  
the details of his life. Secondly, both film and song are highly reflexive about the 
business of being a celebrity, offering commentaries on some of the ‘rules’ of the game. 
And thirdly, they focus on the moment just before becoming famous: presenting this 
moment of graft, of striving, of desire, as a moment of raw ‘realness’, of authenticity. 
These three themes - ‘real’ pre-fame, intimacy and reflexivity - have an entrenched 
cultural currency beyond this specific instance.  All three themes contribute to generating 
the desire for fame and to making it seem ‘ordinary’. 
 
Celebrity, media power and meritocracy 
One of the most useful ways to begin to think about the current forms celebrity culture is 
taking, and its relationship to wider shifts in the dynamics of social and cultural power, is 
to draw on Nick Couldry’s work on media power and its relation to ‘the ordinary’. 
Couldry writes that  
 
By ‘media power’, I do not mean the power (ideological or otherwise) exercised 
upon us by specific media texts; I mean more generally media institutions’ 
differential symbolic power, the concentration of symbolic power in media 
institutions: that is, the fact that we take it for granted that the media have the 
power to speak ‘for us all’ – indeed to define the social ‘reality’ that we share – a 
power which individuals, corporations, pressure groups, professional bodies and 
even perhaps the state do not have.4 
 
Couldry draws from Bourdieu, from Sennett and Cobb’s theories of the hidden injuries of 
class, and from his own interviews with ‘ordinary’ people to argue that there is a 
constructed symbolic boundary between ‘the media world’ and ‘the ordinary world’. If 
the ‘media world’ is marked as a symbolic space of authority, he argues, then ‘the 
ordinary world’ is a space marked by its lack of validation. It is in the gap between these 
  
worlds that the ‘hidden injuries of media power’ are formed. Clearly, this leaves us with 
some very useful tools with which to think about the hidden injuries of celebrity as well 
as media power, and Couldry does point us in this direction, arguing that programmes 
like Big Brother, in which ‘ordinary’ people become celebrities, do not so much 
transcend the division between worlds as work to reinscribe it. ‘To put it crudely’, he 
writes, ‘why else would the transition to celebrity (and the games played in celebrity’s 
border zones) matter so much?’ (p172). In these terms, media celebrity therefore becomes 
a means of symbolic validation, a way to ‘really’ exist, to mean something in public and 
private, to be rich with symbolic as well as material capital. To seek the full glare of 
celebrity media validation is to strive against the hidden injuries of disempowerment; to 
strive against the symbolic disempowerment of the ‘ordinary’.  
 
Of course we are not particularly used to thinking of not-being-a-celebrity in the 
potentially hyperbolic and victimised terms of ‘an injury’. But Couldry’s schema is 
extremely useful as it names a phenomenon and a scale that has different levels of 
intensity. Viewed in this way, it resonates with other academic and critical 
understandings of the relationship between celebrity, media and society. David Morley 
for example summarises Suzanne Moore’s observation that talk shows can demonstrate 
‘the simple but powerful capacity of the media to offer these participants some form of 
recognition, however perverse, of their existence’.5 The importance of such recognition is 
not confined to a few; as Chris Rojek writes:  
 
To some extent, the dynamics of modern society mean that all of us are caught up 
in the celebrity race. It is axiomatic that only a minority acquire the public acclaim 
and recognition that we associate with celebrity status. It is also axiomatic that if 
the majority suffer from feelings of rejection and invalidation, they internalize them 
in ways that pose no threat to the social order.6  
  
 
In other words, what Rojek calls rejection and invalidation, what Moore/Morley might 
term a lack of recognition and what Couldry calls ‘injuries’ have a lot in common. 
Whether at the extreme or ‘normal’ end of the spectrum, these strategies of cultural 
coping or non-coping indicate a society and a culture that has developed some 
extraordinarily unequal ways to validate people’s sense of self and collective worth.  
 
Whilst celebrity culture can be understood in terms of symbolic disempowerment, it can 
also be understood in the context of economic and social disempowerment: in terms of 
unequal access to material resources and social mobility. Here we need to consider the 
character of the political conjuncture we inhabit in terms of the Blairite vision of Britain 
as a ‘meritocracy’. A ‘meritocracy’ is nowadays understood as ‘a social system which 
allows people to achieve success proportionate to their talents and abilities, as opposed to 
one in which social class or wealth is the controlling factor’.7 This is part of the wider 
frame of post-Fordist late capitalism in which relatively rigid class identity distinctions 
have to some extent fractured and multiplied.8 Whilst the routes between class 
stratifications have become marginally more porous - generating some high profile 
examples - substantial class mobility remains out of reach for the majority. Divisions of 
wealth have become exacerbated over the last few decades in particular, to the extent that 
in London 43% of children are now living in poverty.9  
 
Crucially, the Blairite vision is not of an equality of wealth (as under ‘old’ Labour) but 
rather of a state that facilitates the ability to strive for it. As with the logic of late 
capitalism more broadly, this implicitly rests on the proposition that it is only possible for 
a few people to be really ‘successful’. At the same time, however, the structural drive of 
Blairite policies, as with other neo-liberal governments like the US, has been to increase 
marketised competition and to further the dismantling of the welfare state, resulting in the 
  
attempted destruction of collective provision and the erosion of basic quality provision 
for the poor. This has exacerbated the inequalities of opportunity from which ‘talent’ (in 
itself a problematic enough concept) can be healthy enough, culturally equipped enough 
or even well fed enough to ‘rise’ through the cultural and social pool. In other words, 
even taken within its own terms, this discourse of meritocracy fails. That people do not 
surface at the top through ‘merit’ alone is flamboyantly illustrated in the US context by 
the nepotistic career of the current president. As the supportive structures of social 
welfare institutions become impoverished, people shoulder the burden and threats of 
social insecurity on an increasingly individualised basis, in what Ulrich Beck describes as 
‘the risk society’.10 The lottery becomes a core motif for our times.  
 
The increasing disparity between rich and poor, the risky lottery of social opportunity and 
the lack of cultural validation for many people in our society goes some good way to 
explaining the expansion of interest in celebrity culture and the eagerness with which 
opportunities to become a celebrity are taken up and consumed. These are some of the 
wider contexts in which Eminem’s hymn to the fleeting moment of potential for fame is 
produced, in which it is bought by the truckload, and in which it clearly resonates with 
broader structures of feeling. Lose Yourself offers the image of immersion in the moment 
of opportunity for fame. Risk everything to lose your old self and your lack of validation; 
gamble your identity to acquire wealth, to become acknowledged, to become somebody.  
 
Keeping it real: Cinderella and the celebrity work ethic  
Getting to know ‘the real’ or ‘inner’ person behind or inside the celebrity has for a long 
time been an integral means of generating interest in them. As Richard Dyer pointed out 
in Heavenly Bodies: 
 
  
Stars are obviously a case of appearance – all we know of them is what we see and 
hear before us. Yet the whole media construction of stars encourages us to think in 
terms of ‘really’ – what is Crawford really like? Which biography, which word-of-
mouth story, which moment in which film discloses her as she really was? The star 
phenomenon gathers these aspects of contemporary human existence together, 
laced up with the question of ‘really’.11 
 
The question, the enigma of ‘really’, is partly what generates the cultural and economic 
turnover of our fascination with celebrities. It sells them, products about them and 
products tenuously connected to them. It informs the way we connect to celebrities, 
whether as abstract friends, as offering us glimpses of what we would like to be; of 
lifestyles we wish to inhabit, spaces of impossible longing, characteristics against which 
we measure ourselves, or mechanisms through which we bond with other people.12 
 
However, this question, of what celebrities are ‘really’ like, can matter in a range of 
different ways. From psychoanalytic perspectives, asking the question of what a celebrity 
might ‘really’ be like might indicate needs or desires felt to be lacking from our own lives 
or psyches. From post-structuralist perspectives, it could indicate an unhealthily 
essentialist fetishisation symptomatic of Western logocentricism, rather than tracing 
multiple, interrelated developments, intensities or ‘realities’. In terms of cultural history, 
the search to find out what celebrities are ‘really’ like could be understood in the context 
of the rise of Romanticism, possessive individualism and capitalist modernity. In these 
terms the search to find out who and how celebrities ‘really’ are has acted as both oil to 
the wheels of the celebrity machine and as one of its integral motors. Similarly, the 
leaking of celebrity secrets has been a long-standing promotional tactic used in order to 
produce ‘authentic’ information that, as Dyer points out, is ‘often taken to give a 
privileged access to the real person of the star’.13  
  
 
Dyer’s elegant and lucid analyses of film stars such as Judy Garland, Paul Robeson and 
Marilyn Monroe spawned a whole generation of film studies students who wrote essays 
on the construction of a particular star’s image and fame. In his earlier book, Stars, Dyer 
influentially wrote that ‘what is interesting about them is not the characters they have 
constructed […] but rather the business of constructing/performing/being (depending on 
the particular star involved) a “character”’ (ibid). Reading this today, and thinking about 
this in a wider context from that of solely film stars, it is clear that it is not only academic 
and journalistic commentators who find the business of constructing celebrity fascinating. 
Celebrity reflexivity, or mulling over the business of being or becoming a star, has 
become a conspicuous preoccupation of stars themselves, as Lose Yourself/8 Mile along 
with a wide range of other cultural examples (such as Big Brother, or Craig David and 
Sting singing of the Rise and Fall of celebrity) indicate.  
 
The markers of what makes a celebrity ‘authentic’ nowadays is often a combination of 
the presentation of emotional intimacy with the audience, alongside a degree of 
reflexivity about being in the position of a celebrity, together with an ability to reference 
the legitimate ‘moment before’ fame. We might consider such productions of celebrity 
‘normality’, such messages of how they, once, inhabited the position of wanting to be a 
celebrity too, not only to explore how celebrities are ‘just like us’ through the way they 
magnify ‘everyday’ mannerisms or characteristics (that is, what Couldry terms elsewhere 
their ‘extraordinary ordinariness’) but rather to think about how they are presented as 
being like us in wanting to be celebrities. For the idea that ‘to be ordinary’ in our culture 
will probably entail ‘wanting to be a celebrity’ in part gets reproduced and naturalised 
from such positions. 
 
Clearly, referencing ‘the moment before’ fame is in part about money, work and class.  
  
One of the most common celebrity stories, most recently epitomised by J-Lo’s Jenny 
from the Block, is the celebrity who worked his or her way up from the bottom of the 
social pile. The rags-to-riches tale is an age-old narrative. It is the story of Cinderella, 
whose basic plot elements, as Angela Carter said, ‘occur everywhere from China to 
Northern England’, wherever there is social inequality;13 but with different meanings 
according to the time and place, whether they be amusing pastimes for the Viennese 
bourgeoisie or expressions of wish-fulfilment for the Irish poor. That this currency has 
become prominent today is not particularly surprising considering that we live in a world 
in which rags have become more prevalent and riches more opulent. At the same time the 
narrative is inflected in some very modern ways. Instead of merely luxuriating in her 
palatial excess, Cinderella now has to show that she can still remember that she started 
out in the kitchen. This knowledge or awareness structures her character; it stops her 
‘getting above herself’, it keeps her ‘real’.  
 
Why this is such a motif in contemporary culture can be understood in relation to the neo-
liberal discourse of meritocracy. Of course, just as there is plenty right in wanting people 
to move beyond experiences of deprivation, there is nothing wrong with not wanting to 
be arrogant or socially snobby, (and such sentiments have become common sense in a 
way they weren’t even fifty years ago). But as Stuart Hall pointed out many years ago, 
celebrations of ‘the popular’ can take many different political forms.14 And this is not 
always a populism which, in its appreciation of ‘working class’ people and forms, wants 
to create, hold up and celebrate their image in order to try and give them more 
opportunities and resources. J-Lo’s persona in Jenny from the Block, for example, is not 
constructed around what she gives back: it’s what she has extracted from the street – her 
‘realness’, her supposed urban ‘groundedness’ – and has taken away with her that’s 
important. It is a structure of feeling that uses its ‘appreciation’ for the block for entirely 
individualistic purposes, in order to justify enormous wealth and divest itself of any guilt, 
  
rather than to enter into a reciprocal relationship. As such it sustains, furthers and deepens 
inequality rather than tackles it, and is entirely congruent with what has been called 
‘corporate populism’.15 What more perfect image could there be for a company to use to 
sell, what more potent dream to buy than glamour which pretends to be democratic 
through-and-through?  
 
In J-Lo’s case there are of course important explanatory reasons we can bring in here in 
terms of gender and ‘race’, reasons why it is unsurprising that a Latina singer from the 
Bronx might be attracted to bling. It has long been recognised that cultures of ostentatious 
wealth are ways for disenfranchised people to stick two fingers up to those who held 
them down and back. This is clearly visible in the thick heavy gold chains of black 
rappers, also worn by young white working-class boys who share their material and 
cultural disempowerment (and who often want to borrow what is perceived as being their 
hyper-masculinity). It is apparent in one feminist discourse that, since the shoulder-
padded working girls of the 1980s at least, has trumpeted ostentatious wealth as a 
signifier of female liberation. J-Lo offers a similar celebration of a materialist young 
feminism as the Destiny’s Child anthem Independent Women, which celebrates ‘all the 
honeys / that make the money’.  
 
But acknowledging these moves as resistant does not mean that they are wholly 
progressive and emancipatory. As Don Slater has pointed out, there is a fine but deeply 
significant line between acknowledging that a consumer or a culture is ‘active’, and 
assuming that it is ‘oppositional’. To trace the story of the confusion between them is to 
trace one of the stories of cultural studies, and in between these positions there is ‘the 
most powerful insight of the whole tradition, that cultural studies is part of a social 
process of making social sense.’16 Such examples offer one type of liberation (e.g. gender 
equality) only by annexing or connecting it to a celebratory endorsement of the profit 
  
motive of consumer capitalism. Whereas some used to think that black struggles and 
gender struggles were by themselves opposed to capitalism (and they often were, as the 
people on the top of the pile were wholly, instead of mainly, dominated by the white, the 
male and the upper class) today it is clear that they are not. As Sheila Rowbotham, the 
campaigner for women’s liberation from the 1960s, poignantly puts it: ‘our hopes have 
been appropriated, our aspirations twisted.’ Identity politics became articulated to the 
corporate search for profit as well as the search for co-operation:  
 
Ironically, openings created by social movements were to present market 
opportunities – the slogans transmogrified into designer labels and some quick-
footed ‘alternative’ capitalists emerged from the melee. Yet the radical dream of the 
sixties was to be stillborn, for we were not to move towards the cooperative 
egalitarian society we had imagined. Instead the sixties ushered in an order which 
was more competitive and less equal than the one we had protested against.17  
 
Paul Gilroy talks of a similar process as ‘filleting’, a process by which corporate interests 
gut a progressive discourse ‘for what they want and adapt it to the rhythms of their own 
complicity with consumerism’.18  
 
This highlights the importance of linkages, or articulation: of how discourses can be 
linked, re-appropriated or co-opted for progressive or negative ends (in other words, to 
promote equality, co-operation and the sharing of power and resources, or to promote 
inequality, individualism, and the waste and uneven distribution of power and resources) 
and how discourses build their power through alliances. If we are looking for what 
Williams called ‘resources of hope’, or meanings that have the potential to be 
rearticulated to more progressive ends, one might be in the widespread ridiculing of J-
Lo’s sentiments of being able to ‘keep it real’ despite her wealth. She clearly is not the 
  
same as she was when she was much poorer, and, to many, the inability to recognise this, 
and to offer little affective sense of the difficulty of moving out of such social 
circumstances, is insulting both to those who do live in conditions of material poverty 
and to the intelligence of her audience. 19 
 
Might another be the different types of relationship that are articulated between 
celebrities and their materially poorer ‘roots’? Ms Dynamite, for instance, is often figured 
as exposing or highlighting awareness of the broader social issues that surround and have 
created racism and economic deprivation. Within the constraints of celebrity being 
always, by definition, individualistic, the Ms Dynamite example does at least offer less 
individualistic messages. However, this also raises important questions about whether 
and how celebrity can ever be used to further equalities, and if not, what the opposite or 
alternatives to celebrity might be. As the Ms Dynamite example shows, there are clearly 
many ways in which celebrities are used to promote discourses that benefit the many 
rather than the few. The pronouncements celebrities have made, the attitudes they 
embody and the identifications they make possible can all be used to instigate cultural 
change that engenders equality rather than exploitation. For example, from the 
suffragettes to the Spice Girls and beyond many different types of feminisms have been 
promoted through celebrities. Non-governmental organisations are perennially keen to 
garner celebrity support as they raise the news profile of an issue and engender affective 
identifications. 
 
The most obvious contemporary model of ‘democratic’ celebrity is probably the celebrity 
of the ‘leader’ of the Zapatistas in Mexico, Subcommandante Marcos. Masked and 
anonymous, this is a celebrity who everyone and anyone can claim to be, as no-one 
knows who he ‘really’ is. It is a self-consciously dissolved model of celebrity in which 
Marcos is everyone, sharing the fame like that other model of celebrity where celebrity is 
  
dissolved into the populace, Spartacus. Stanley Kubrick’s well-known 1960 epic about 
slave emancipation (penned by a blacklisted screenwriter) famously featured other male 
slaves taking in solidarity the identity of condemned revolutionary Roman slave-turned-
hero, so that one and all became a shared identity (‘I am Spartacus!’). Analogously, the 
recent finale of Buffy the Vampire Slayer dissolved Buffy’s celebrity and power into all 
and any potential slayers.   
 
Yet of course in another way these are not so much ‘alternative’ models of celebrity as 
rather its antithesis, in which the celebrity is also eradicated by being dissolved into the 
collectivity. However progressive it is, Ms Dynamite’s story is still represented as an 
individualised achievement. Whilst there are aspects of some celebrities that can be used 
or articulated in less unequal ways, structurally, ‘celebrity’ is always by definition 
individualistic: it is both a magnified example of the individualisation of our society and 
a key mechanism through which this process of individualisation functions. 20 In ‘Letter to 
a Harsh Critic’ Gilles Deleuze terms ‘the opposite of celebrity’ as a set of liberated 
singularities, opening a ‘self’ up to the multiplicities within:  
 
It’s a strange business, speaking for yourself, in your own name, because it doesn’t 
at all come with seeing yourself as an ego or a person or a subject. Individuals find 
a real name for themselves, rather, only through the harshest exercise in 
depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere 
within them, to the intensities running through them. A name as the direct 
awareness of such intensive multiplicity is the opposite of the depersonalization 
effected by the history of philosophy: it’s depersonalization through love rather 
than subjection. What one says comes from the depths of one’s ignorance, the 
depths of one’s own underdevelopment. One becomes a set of liberated 
  
singularities, words, names, fingernails, things, animals, little events: quite the 
reverse of a celebrity.21 
 
In these Deleuzian terms, as in Zapatismo, to be the opposite of a celebrity is to not seek 
individual fame, to not emphasise individuality, but to dissolve such individualism and 
open ourselves up to the multiplicities that constitute us. To return to Eminem‘s phrase 
with which I began, it is a way to ‘lose yourself’, though with a different inflection: not 
losing yourself to find a more ‘authentic’ individual self to market, to gain dominating 
power through, but to open it up to what is shared, to create mutual ownerships.    
 
Lost and found 
In our contemporary ‘meritocratic’ culture, new possibilities of social and cultural 
transition are being produced alongside sharp inequalities of wealth and status. This is 
both reflected in and produced by the current predominant discourse of celebrity culture 
that surrounds us. In such a context, intimacy, reflexivity and dramatising the ‘grounded’ 
moment of pre-fame are key tropes through which the excitement around current 
celebrity culture is reproduced and maintained. All three are currently in widespread 
circulation, and all three are ways of making fame seem ordinary, when of course, unless 
we are all receiving the same material and symbolic recognition, it is no such thing.  At 
the same time, there are a multiplicity of uses to which celebrity, like anti-celebrity, are 
and can be put, and in we can consider how celebrity is being used in the service of 
power in particular instances: whether it is being used to help shore it up or dish it out. 
Simultaneously, we inhabit a variety of roles as producers, consumers, creators, 
distributors and communicators, roles through which we combine with others to endorse, 
reject, remould or create what celebrity means in relation to our ‘ordinary’ lives.  
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